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Abstract 
The concepts of well-being and quality of life concern evaluative judgements. 
There is insufficient understanding in current literature that these judgements 
are made variously due to not only use of differing values and differing 
research instruments but also differing standpoints, differing purposes, and 
differing theoretical views and ontological presuppositions. The paper 
elucidates these sources of differences and how they underlie the wide diversity 
of current conceptions. 
 
JEL: A13, D60, I30, Z13 
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Understanding the Diversity of Conceptions of Well-
Being and Quality of Life 
1 The Concept of  Well-Being/Quality of  Life – what it is 
and what it is not 
The concept of quality of life refers to an evaluation (an evaluative judgement) 
about major aspects, or the entirety, of a life or a society. The concept of well-
being is similarly an abstraction that is used to refer to the quality of any of 
many valued aspects of (a) life, or some set thereof, or their totality (Gasper 
2007a). 
The ‘well-being’ (WB) term is used more when we speak at the level of 
individuals, and ‘quality of life’ (QoL) somewhat more when we speak of 
communities, localities, and societies. Similarly, ‘well-being’ is used somewhat 
more to refer to actual experience, and ‘quality of life’ more to refer to context 
and environments. But in both cases the terms are used with a broad range of 
meanings, and the ranges almost completely overlap. This reflects that the two 
came from different disciplines—‘well-being’ more from psychology, and 
‘quality of life’ more from sociology and social policy—which have only 
gradually and incompletely become open to each other.  
These evaluations of a life situation, a life path (Chekola 2007), or a 
society can be made in many different ways. Let us distinguish six dimensions 
of variation in making the evaluations: 
1. variation with reference to which aspects of being, of life; questions 
arise thus of scope and focus. 
The choices of scope and focus link to a further five issues in evaluation: 
2. which values underpin an interpretation of well-being and/or quality of 
life? 
3. research instruments: which methods of observation and/or measurement 
and which methods of interpretation are employed? 
4. with respect to which purposes, for this affects what sort of valuation is 
done: for purposes of understanding, or of praising/condemning, or of 
choosing/acting, … 
5. the evaluation can be undertaken by different persons, from different 
standpoints: for oneself, for others, for and in groups, … 
6. the evaluation can use different theoretical frameworks. This is connected 
to but not reducible to the preceding issues, and one key question 
concerns what conception is used of the nature of being a person. 
The relativities with respect to focus, values and research instruments are more 
obvious, and we will consider them first. Those concerning purposes, 
standpoints and theoretical perspective are more subtle and we approach them 
later. 
These dimensions of variation underlie the wide range of interpretations 
of well-being and quality of life, and mean that there is great danger of 
oversimplification. For example, there is far more than a binary contrast 
between ‘subjective well-being’ and ‘objective well-being’ (SWB-OWB). There 
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are many relevant interpretations of both, and the two categories overlap. Box 
1 refers to three dimensions of variation: first, well-being measures can focus 
on subjective states or on a person’s conditions and circumstances; second, 
they can be undertaken using private values or values endorsed through a 
public procedure; and third, they can be by self-reports or by external 
observers (e.g., as in Kahneman’s work recording ‘objective happiness’). When 
speaking of SWB or OWB I will prioritize the first of these criteria, focus. 
Within the SWB literature, self-report on self-selected subjective states (case 8 
in Box 1) appears to be the usual main category but is not the only relevant 
one. 
 Even from only the first relativity, the choices about scope, we can see 
the concepts of WB and QoL as abstract nouns. Each concept is an umbrella 
for many more specific concepts (Gasper 2007a). This is comparable to how 
we need to think in terms of ‘poverties, not poverty’, in Manfred Max-Neef et 
al. (1991)’s phrase. ‘Poverty is not [just] a lack of goods but exclusion from 
esteem and power’ (Mary Douglas, 1982: 181). 
Behind this lies a yet more fundamental point. Neither well-being nor 
quality of life is a determinate or definite single thing, or just two things – 
‘subjective well being’ and ‘objective well being’ – or any number of things, 
lying out there, ready to be measured. Instead each is an evaluation of life / a life 
/ life chances. Reflecting the second to sixth relativities, even if there were only 
one relevant aspect or all the aspects could be aggregated, there is no unique, 
eternal authoritative way for such evaluation – either in the mind of any single 
person or in the deliberations of a political community. 
However, instead of saying ‘valuation of life situation’, which indicates an 
activity of evalution or the product of such an activity, we typically hypostatize 
or reify a noun—‘well-being’ or ‘quality of life’—suggesting a concrete definite 
thing.1  The fallacy of misplaced concreteness is embedded in much of our 
language. People often tend to think of WB and QoL as definite entities. Even 
though Quality-of-Life thinking arose because of the inadequacies of GNP, the 
mental mould of a single aggregating index—whether for the individual or the 
collectivity—is politically and administratively convenient. Politicians who 
want to condemn, make promises, and take credit, may like to reduce a 
complex and contingent evaluation to a notion like GNP, something which 
they can influence and publicly point to. Many scientists concentrate on 
working with figures which although possibly unreliable and certainly very 
incomplete are thought—as in the history of GNP as a policy objective—to 
yet say something objective, precise and politically validated about important 
matters. 
This paper follows instead Amartya Sen’s principle that interpretations of 
inherently ambiguous ideas should illuminate, not attempt to eliminate, the 
ambiguity. We should not claim that there is only one true version. We should 
ask, for any WB or QoL evaluation: who is doing what to/for/with whom, 
when, where, and why? 
 
                                                 
1 Hypostatize = construe a conceptual entity as a real existence; reify = consider an 
abstract concept to be real. (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hypostatize) 
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Box 1 
Different ‘objective’/‘subjective’ well-being divisions 
To use a single contrast between ‘subjective and objective indicators of welfare’ seriously 
oversimplifies. One issue concerns what is measured (subjective states or non-feelings). A 
separate issue concerns how and by whom it is measured. Subjective states can be studied 
by externals, as in case 3 below; but self-reports on subjective states (case 8) are also often 
valid and reliable measures of the states. We need then at least four categories, by allowing 
two options in each of these two dimensions. Veenhoven (2007) advises that we should use 
a 3x3 rather than 2x2 matrix, to indicate that we face a spectrum of possibilities along both 
dimensions rather than clearcut divides. The table below adds instead a third dimension, of 
public-determination versus private-determination, and uses a 2x2x2 structure to show eight 
cases. For example, in the ‘social needs approach’ (Gordon 2000) a relevant reference 
group determines societally required functionings or capabilities, whose achievement is then 
externally measured for the client group.  
DIMENSION (2): WHOSE VALUES? (public or private values?) 
/ WHich standpoint DEterminES THE EXACT FOCUS? 
 
FOCUS AND VALUATION BY PUBLIC 
VALUES 
FOCUS AND VALUATION BY 
PRIVATE VALUES 
Dimension (1): FOCUS ON  
CONDITIONS OR SUBJECTIVE STATES 
Conditions Subjective states Conditions Subjective 
states 
‘Objective’, 
meaning external 
measurement / 
estimation 
Case 1:  
Focus on publicly 
approved and 
estimated non-
feelings: an ‘OWB’ 
case; e.g. observe 
how far people 
(can) walk, etc., as 
in the ‘social needs 
approach’ (Gordon 
2000).  
Case 3: 
E.g., external 
monitoring of 
publicly approved 
set of brain 
functions and 
physiological 
indicators (such 
as [low] pain)  
Case 5: 
External report on 
privately 
prioritised 
circumstances; 
one asks persons 
to identify the life-
dimensions they 
find important, 
then one 
measures those 
(Bowling 1995) 
Case 7: 
External report 
on the 
achievement 
of privately 
prioritised 
subjective 
states 
Dimension (3): 
METHOD OF 
MEASUREMENT / 
ESTIMATION 
 
 
 
‘Subjective’, 
meaning use of 
subject’s self-
report 
Case 2: 
 
Self report on 
socially prioritised 
aspects (e.g.: ‘I can 
walk 100 metres’) 
Case 4: 
 
Self report on 
socially prioritised 
types of feeling 
(e.g.: ‘ít hurts a 
lot’) 
Case 6:  
 
Self report on 
privately 
prioritised 
circumstances  
= subjective 
measures of 
poverty or QoL 
(e.g., ‘I rank the 
facilities for my 
walking hobby as 
2 out of 10’).  
Case 8:  
 
Self-report on 
subjective 
states. 
= ‘Self-report 
subjective 
well-being’ 
(e.g.: ‘I am 
very happy 
with how far I 
can walk’) 
Since cases 2, 4, 5 and 7 are probably less common, the classification often becomes 
simplified, and the dangerous intuition can arise that a public-values perspective equates to 
external measurement and a private-values perspective to use of self-report. Further, value 
questions can be embarrassing, so choice of values can be hidden too, and the OWB/SWB 
contrast may become presented as if it concerns measurement method only.The three 
distinct dimensions of ‘Who decides?’, ‘Look at what?’ and ‘Look how?’ are then completely 
conflated. 
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The paper looks at the six dimensions of variation. Section 2 provides an 
overview of types of approach to conceptualising quality of life and well-being, 
with emphasis on which aspects of life they focus on. Sections 3, 4 and 5 
investigate the issues of value priorities, research methodology, and purposes 
and standpoint. Section 6 examines major theoretical sources of diversity: 
differences between more individualistic and more social conceptions of 
persons, and between hedonic and eudaimonic conceptions of felt well-being. 
It contrasts conceptions of well-being assessment as, on the one hand, a form 
of mental temperature taking and, on the other hand, a complex and inherently 
ambiguous process of evaluative judgement, and argues for the second 
perspective. Section 7 gives a concluding review and observations. 
2   Families of  approaches - a diversity of  types of  focus 
Variation in the dimensions just mentioned generates many different 
conceptions of well-being and quality of life. David Phillips’ book Quality of Life 
(2006) surveys a series of seven different research streams, each of which 
contains sub-streams. 
[1] SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (SWB). This now prominent stream has 
spread from psychology to economics and sociology. But SWB concepts and 
measures are not sufficient for all purposes. The remaining streams, except 
perhaps the preference fulfilment variant of [3a], are diverse interpretations of 
‘objective well-being’.  
[2] HEALTH-RELATED QUALITY OF LIFE  
[3a] ‘UTILITY’ – as interpreted in 20th century economics; this stream looks 
at purchasing power and/or imputed preference fulfilment  
[3b] NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES – a stream that contains several variants 
concerning needs fulfilment or achievement of valued capabilities 
[4] POVERTY STUDIES – this stream concentrates on the potential QoL of 
an individual: opportunities and their societal determinants  
[5] COMMUNITY STUDIES – here the focus is on social context/fabric and 
the QoL of a community 
[6] SOCIETAL QUALITY OF LIFE CONSTRUCTS – these approaches 
integrate a number of the above aspects. 
The numbers in the list are those of Phillips’ chapters, which proceed 
from more individualistic to more social conceptions. I give a fuller summary 
in the first two columns of Figure 1, which presents my interpretive overview 
of the book. Together the columns of the table present an analysis of the 
streams in terms of the dimensions of variation which we have identified. 
SWB itself is multi-dimensional. Psychologists show us that well-being 
studies and ill-being studies are not identical. Subjective well-being has at least 
three major dimensions –positive affect; negative affect; life-satisfaction– and 
each of these has subdimensions. Ill-being and positive well-being can coexist 
at a given moment as different elements in one’s life.  
Much work tries to rank or choose between the conceptions: for example 
to compare and choose between the criteria of happiness and capability,  
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FIGURE 1 
 An analytical summary of David Phillips’ Quality Of Life (2006) 
FAMILIES OF 
APPROACHES  
FOCUS AND SCOPE 
(per variant) 
DISCIPLINE(S) / 
THEORY BASE 
VALUES PURPOSES AND 
STANDPOINT 
[1] SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING (SWB); 
three aspects:- 
1 – happiness 
 (positive affect) 
2 – pain  
(negative affect)  
3 – life satisfaction 
Individual well-being (WB) 
as felt by the individual.  
Work on ‘instant 
happiness’ stresses 
aspects 1 & 2 more than 
does work in a eudaimonic 
/ reflective well-being 
tradition.  
Psychology, 
and neo-utilitarian 
economics and 
sociology. (But 
psychology has 
diverse schools.) 
Aristotelian 
philosophy 
stresses aspect 3. 
(Priority to) Individuals’ 
judgements 
of 
A. pleasure/pain 
B. meaning 
- For description and 
explanation; & 
- For evaluations by 
the individual or that 
seek to represent the 
individual 
[2] HEALTH-
RELATED QUALITY 
OF LIFE 
[2a] Individual WB/QoL  
- Physical (and mental) 
functionings & capabilities; 
listed by professionals (or 
the subject individuals), 
then measured by 
professionals (or self-
rated).  
[2b] Health-related QoL of 
communities 
Health sciences - Ideas about normal 
capabilities and 
functionings  
- Either belief in superior 
knowledge and 
judgement of 
professionals; or  belief in 
rights and superior 
knowledge of patients 
For allocation of rights 
and resources for 
medical care: 
- policy level 
- programme level 
- individual cases 
[3a] ‘UTILITY’ Here individual WB is 
imputed from individual’s 
resources and/or choices, 
especially choices in real 
or simulated markets 
Mainstream 
market-oriented 
economics 
Values of market: 
1. spenders’ values, 
insofar as money-
backed; 2. income 
distribution given; 3. 
people held responsible 
for own choices (which 
are assumed to reflect 
preferences) 
For describing, 
explaining, and 
conducting allocation 
according to market 
principles 
A. Prudential values theory 
 
 
B. Human needs theories  
 
C. Doyal & Gough’s theory 
of need 
Humanistic 
economics.   
Philosophy.  
 
Humanistic 
psychology.  
Critical social 
policy 
Humanistic values:- 
In A: what makes lives go 
better. 
In B: requirements of a 
decent life. 
In C: avoidance of 
serious harm; social 
participation. 
[3b] NEEDS AND 
CAPABILITIES – all 
variants consider WB 
& (actual or potential) 
QoL of individuals 
D. Sen’s capability 
approach 
E. Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach 
Humanistic 
economics. 
Humanistic 
philosophy. 
In D: positive freedom to 
achieve reasoned values. 
In E:  As B plus D. 
Variants B, E: for 
explanation 
 
All the theories: for 
public policy 
(constitutional and 
legal frameworks; 
strategies, 
programmes, projects, 
specific allocations to 
persons)  
[4] POVERTY 
STUDIES  
– on individual 
(potential) QoL, and its 
social determinants 
A. Work on poverty lines 
B. Wider concepts of 
deprivation 
C. Attention to processes 
and outcomes of social 
inclusion and exclusion 
Social economics 
Social policy  
 
Sociology 
Similar to 3b, but:  
Variant A is often limited 
to material aspects and 
values;  
variants B & C are not. 
Variant A: for 
description, and public 
policy. 
Variants B & C: also 
for explanation 
 
[5] COMMUNITY 
STUDIES – on social 
context/fabric & 
community QoL 
Study of the direct value 
and indirect impacts of 
various forms of social 
capital and social cohesion 
Sociology 
Social policy 
Public health 
Emphasis on people as 
group members 
- Explanation. 
- Background work for 
public policy 
A. Bernard’s democratic 
dialectic 
Sociology Liberty, equality, 
fraternity 
B. Berger-Schmitt & Noll: 
overarching QoL construct 
Social policy Implies all the values 
listed above 
[6] SOCIETAL 
QUALITY OF LIFE 
CONSTRUCTS 
C. Social Quality approach 
(Beck et al, 2001) 
Sociology Similar to values of [3b], 
plus of [5] 
For public policy 
(through from 
constitutional and legal 
frameworks, to 
projects) 
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implicitly usually for the purpose in public policy analysis of ranking alternative 
possible or actual states. Certainly the criteria of happiness and capability do 
not always correlate. More happiness might not be accompanied by more 
capability. Phillips reviews research that suggests a strong locality culture may 
raise happiness but is sometimes bad for health; since of course the culture’s 
content—its habits concerning diet, exercise and stress—makes a difference. 
Similarly, greater positive freedom and autonomy may not always produce 
more happiness; some uses of freedom prove to be self-damaging. Capability 
theorists have nevertheless proposed several reasons to prefer capability over 
subjective well-being in public policy evaluation (see especially Crocker 2008). 
Rather than try for a general ranking of the various conceptions I will try 
to clarify how they relate to each other and, to some extent, what their 
respective roles may be. We start by comparing focus and scope: what aspects 
does an approach focus on?  
We can group these traditions in studies of well-being according to their 
area of focus, and then arrange the main focus areas noted in the second 
column of Figure 1 into a story-like series.  Conventional economics and other 
utilitarian conceptions present a sequential story, a ladder of living, from 
having resources and getting goods, through to consumption and on to 
happiness. The stages fall into three main sets:  I. Inputs/ Resources; II. Life 
content: Functionings, etc.; III. Thoughts and Feelings (see Gasper 2007b; 
Robeyns & vd Veen 2007).  
The story told by hedonic perspectives on subjective well-being differs 
somewhat from that told by eudaimonic perspectives. In the former, as in the 
utilitarian tradition, happiness is seen as an output from activity and 
consumption. In the latter story, happiness as eudaimonia—gratification or 
fulfilment—comes from acting in accordance with one’s best potentials and 
qualities and is seen as inherent in meaningful and valued activities, rather than 
as a separable output. ‘To talk about the “pleasure” of contemplation is only to 
say that contemplation is done for its own sake; it is not to refer to any 
emotion that accompanies contemplation’ (Seligman 2003: 112). 
Let us consider now the other five dimensions or relativities. 
3   The values in assessments of  well-being and quality of  
life 
Every WB/QoL conception is value-laden, since each is an attempt to 
highlight what is considered (by someone) as important. As Phillips says, there 
are strictly speaking no ‘Objective Well-Being’ measures, in the sense of value-
independent measures; more accurate would be to refer instead to ‘collectively 
subjective’ measures (Phillips 2006: 233): measures which are granted some 
authority through collective processes and which measure the presence of 
collectively determined ‘substantive goods’ (Scanlon 1993). Highlighting SWB 
matches a utilitarian ethic, or a libertarian value-stance (Phillips 2006: 227-8) in 
which even if  felt well-being comes as part of a lifestyle that indirectly 
damages people it is considered appropriate to let people make their own 
choices and their own mistakes. If, however, their choices damage other 
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people, not only themselves, then according to J.S. Mill’s criterion public 
intervention becomes potentially justified. 
Choices of focus depend partly on choices of values (Gasper 2007b). The 
two are often almost identical: for example, a value priority to capability leads 
to a focus on capability, and a value priority to possession leads to a focus on 
possessions. 
All societies generate distinctive but diverse systems of values: value 
orientations vary between and within societies. This receives surprisingly little 
emphasis in some SWB literature which instead seeks universal patterns. Some 
value choices concern features of a society as a whole: e.g., collectivist versus 
individualist, or hierarchist versus egalitarian (or in Mary Douglas’ typology, 
high versus low group orientation, and high versus low ‘grid’ control). Some 
value choices concern other persons; for example whether to emphasise their 
capabilities (potentials) or their functionings. Value choices of persons for 
themselves include those about leisure versus work, and about relationships 
compared to things. Western Europeans appear in general to put higher 
relative value on leisure and relationships than do USA residents, we are told. 
Notwithstanding such variations, modern capitalist societies as a whole 
appear to have become addicted to monetized activity (Bartolini 2007). High 
monetized activity is equated to ‘high performance’. The dominant value 
systems do not contain a notion of ‘enough’. Here is an example from the 
Netherlands, in a major report from the national research institute for public 
health and the environment.  
Little support for the high-performance society: A public opinion survey revealed 
that less than 10% of the Dutch population is comfortable with a society moving 
in the direction of progressive globalisation and individualisation. Many Dutch 
people, from all political parties, would rather belong to a society in which 
regional development and solidarity continue to play a role. However, denial of 
the high-performance society carries a price tag, considering that the average 
European income may only rise by a modest 40% from the present up to 2040, 
whereas most official projections aim at and expect up to 140% rise in income by 
2040. (RIVM 2004 – Summary, p.5) 
The ‘high performance society’ may thus be felt by most people in The 
Netherlands as a low performance society.2  High performance is presumed in 
the report to mean high monetized turnover. Most of the Dutch population 
are reported not to want its presumed concomitants, but the report’s language 
gives priority to economic growth as the meaning of high-performance. This is 
seen in its talk of ‘denial’ and ‘only a modest 40%’, as if 40% increase could 
hardly be enough, and the use of ‘high performance’ to mean high monetized-
activity, high throughput and high monetary income. This misuse of 
‘performance’ is recurrent not incidental. Similarly misused is the term ‘the 
achieving society’ (RIVM 2004: 13), as if income is the only form or the sine 
qua non for achievement. 
                                                 
2 A fable that circulates in the Internet, of a conversation between a New York City 
‘high performer’ and a Caribbean fisherman, makes a similar point. The end goal for 
years of frantic striving by the ‘high performer’ will be to attain the lifestyle that the 
fisherman already possesses. 
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Values vary between and within the research traditions identified by 
Phillips, as seen in the fourth column of our Figure 1. Phillips shows the range 
in value commitments, from strongly libertarian and individualist perspectives, 
through to more collectivist perspectives that emphasise fraternity and/or to 
egalitarian views. (Not all collectively-oriented perspectives stress equality; 
some are hierarchical.) He finds some disagreements around all values, 
concerning relative weights or even validity, except in the case of a single value: 
the second component of SWB – negative affect, pain. All traditions agree that 
pain should be reduced (Phillips, p.231). 
4  Differences of  research methodology 
Different choices of research instruments, methods of observation and 
measurement and interpretation, reflect differences on the other issues, 
including on theoretical perspective —is, for example, SWB a counterpart of 
length and weight?—and on values; but they are not purely determined by 
them and so need separate attention. The choices reflect also different views 
on the nature of social science. Even so, choices of method can easily be 
overstressed relative to the other choices. The discussions about meanings of 
‘objective well-being’ versus ‘subjective well-being’, for example, concern 
choices of focus and standpoint and not only of methods of measurement, as 
we saw in Box 1. 
In some cases methods-choices may stem from value-choices. Daniel 
Kahneman has identified various fallacies in revealed preference methodology, 
the claim that we can validly impute people’s ideas about well-being simply 
from watching what they do.3  But listening to what people say, as relied on in 
much SWB research, is also error-prone. Judgements for oneself made in 
thought experiment studies give much more relative weight to physical health 
than we find from studies based on real life situations, for example. In real life 
people give more relative weight to social and psychological functioning than 
in the experiments; we see this for example in the case of the truly rather than 
conjecturally disabled (Phillips 2006: 44-7). We should thus be wary also of 
contingent valuation studies.  
Both these methods choices are really value choices. Contingent valuation 
methods and revealed preference methodology are weak if seen as predictions 
or measures of actual satisfaction. But both reflect particular value choices: to 
leave people to carry their own responsibility and free to make their own 
mistakes. We encounter well-being here as a ‘practical concept’: we do 
something with it in a social situation; we use it for certain purposes (Seel 
1997). In the case of contingent valuation exercises, people are asked to give 
well-being estimates in order to influence future collective choices. In the case 
of revealed preference analysis, scientists may feel short of time to consult 
people, or mistrust doing so, and instead opt to let them live with the 
consequences of valuations implied by their actions. 
                                                 
3 See also Hirata and Vendrik (2007) on how experienced utility sustainedly diverges 
from expectations. 
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The capability approach calls for a deeper type of talk: for reflection and 
debate, rather than for each person to only consult a supposed built-in utility-
meter (in reality one’s socialized and partly unconsidered notions). In principle 
the approach sees people as social individuals who are capable of reflection 
especially through interaction. This is an appropriate synthesis, though the 
approach will not fulfil that potential if it reduces public reasoning solely to 
vote-counting or opinion-polling (Gasper 2007c, 2009a).  
Some methodological choices involve a hunt for simple universal patterns. 
Much SWB work hunts for clear-cut correlations within the data on SWB self-
reports. This fits with an underlying theoretical framework in which people are 
standardised machines produced from a single factory, and thus often with an 
interest in one or other proposed story of the selection pressures and 
evolutionary outcomes in human prehistory (see e.g., Dutt 2001, Easterlin 
2005, Frank 2005, Veenhoven 2005). In contrast, authors who stress that 
people are diversely culturally moulded (e.g., de Jesus Garcia et al., 2007)—
within as well as between countries—expect to find at best situation-specific 
pathways, not simple universal generalisations (Pawson & Tilley 1997).4   
The hunt for generalisations sometimes concentrates on the shoals of 
published material from rich countries, rather than on potentially more 
enlightening comparisons possible between widely different countries and 
times. Some work even deals almost exclusively with USA data yet offers 
conclusions stated in general terms. In contrast Easterlin (2005) is a good 
example of wide-ranging historical and geographical comparison, including 
with countries like post-war Japan which showed explosive income per capita 
growth but little or no SWB gain. Unsurprisingly though, pragmatic 
considerations of cost, speed and data availability often drive research. 
5   Purposes behind, and standpoints in, judgements of  
well-being and quality of  life 
We need and use different QoL and WB concepts for different purposes. 
Income per head is a relevant measure when our purpose is to understand the 
workings of the monetized economy, but is unsuited in several ways to be an 
evaluative WB or QoL measure. We must at least modify it. Such adjustment is 
subject to great limits given the fundamentally different natures of the starting 
point—a measure of activity levels—and the intended destination: a measure 
of well-being. We can instead directly examine well-being of a current local 
population by various measures, including their own assessments. Such 
assessments are not adequate for policy purposes though if we do not adjust 
                                                 
4 In social studies of health, Wilkinson’s thesis holds that, universally, inequality leads 
to lower social cohesion, which has psycho-social consequences (higher stress, lower 
esteem, etc.) which produce negative health impacts. But testing has refuted the first 
two proposed linkages as having general validity (Phillips 2006, Ch.7). Sometimes 
inequality brings more social cohesion, or at any rate the two are associated; and 
inequality is not sufficient to cause stress, for which perceived injustice is also 
required. 
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them to reflect damage done to other people, including people elsewhere 
and/or who will live later (Robeyns & van der Veen 2007). 
Similarly, Doyal and Gough (1991)’s Theory of Human Need, for example, 
does not emphasise happiness, because its purpose is to guide first-priority 
public resource allocations and commitments: first things first – including, in 
their view, physical and mental health and ability to function effectively in 
one’s society and avoid major harm. Beyond that level the theory is deliberately 
underspecified and compatible with different ethical theories, such as a liberal 
insistence that people have the right to be unhappy in their own way or a full 
utilitarian insistence on a duty to help make people happy. Some people believe 
that pleasure promotion must not be part of the set of priorities for public 
promotion, because they think pleasure is too contingent, personally specific 
and idiosyncratic (cf. Gilbert 2005). 
Purposes affect what sort of identification of ‘well’ and ‘quality’ will or 
should be done in well-being and QoL assessment. We can distinguish at least 
these purposes:- 
1. In order to understand and predict other people we need to make judgements 
of their well-being, as they see it and as others see it.  
2. To provide meaning to our existence: including to understand ourselves 
better.  
3. To judge (and advise on) what is good for ourselves/others. 
4. To guide public activity/provision, the decision making of collectivities. One 
is likely here to lean to a conception of WB/QoL that is about: (a) 
providing basic conditions for a good life, rather than ensuring its 
fulfilment; except in the case of children and other wards; (b) 
conditions for a typical decent/good life, not for fulfilment of every sort 
of personally idiosyncratic preference. 
For purposes of understanding and predicting other people, verstehen—
empathetic understanding of others’ meanings, perceptions and values—is 
frequently necessary for plausible social science, just as it is for fruitful 
coexistence. To conceive of well-being only with reference to material things, 
for example, is a very incomplete picture of deprivation, and hence a bad basis 
for explanation. We need empathy and ability to understand and use criteria of 
value, to see how people conceive of their well-being and that of others. The 
same skills are required in relevant ranking (purpose 3 above) and appropriate 
guided social action (purpose 4 above). 
The second and third categories of purpose deserve fuller comment. Just 
as we need to understand how others conceive of their quality of life, we make 
judgements of our own QoL/WB in order to guide our choices. Or do we? 
Much decisionmaking is by routine, habit, rule, or accident. Some people may 
have little idea of ‘self’, and/or great feeling of obligation to others, and/or 
little confidence about their ability to understand or predict. Daniel Gilbert 
declares that his book Stumbling on Happiness will help us to understand why we 
cannot predict what will make us happy, and why much that we plan for will 
inevitably be stale when we reach it. Even so, judgements of well-being or QoL 
have an even more basic role: they help us to make sense in our lives, including 
make sense of other people’s lives and actions which interact with ours, and 
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thus help us to be able to go on. This is one rationale behind much art. As 
Allister MacGregor (personal communication) puts it, only by having a 
conception of wellbeing can we know how to regard others, can others know 
how to regard us and can we know how to regard ourselves.  
What is the purpose of an SWB self-report, beyond letting one be released 
by finishing a questionnaire exercise and positioning oneself in relation to 
those who will read the results? The additional purpose is to take a stance in 
one’s life that influences how one proceeds further. The suspicion arises that 
well favoured people will understate their blessings—for to dwell on one’s 
good fortune can undermine one’s readiness to meet future challenges—and 
that ill favoured people may overlook some of their misfortunes, again in order 
to be better able to go ahead. In both cases the truth might be dysfunctional. 
This is not to deny that some of the well-favoured’s supposed blessings might 
be hollow and that some ill-favoured people gain fulfilment in ways, such as in 
rich family relations or in religion, that can be overlooked in certain forms of 
assessing quality of life. The ‘poor’ could be poor in income, but rich in other 
things that are more important for SWB.  
Recognising an SWB self-report as a practical attitude, a stance 
constructed for particular purposes in a particular context, one will—even if 
fully satisfied with it as an SWB measure for that purpose in that context—be 
wary about its relevance for other purposes and in other contexts. Discussions 
of the SWB criterion with reference to cases of the happy poor should 
distinguish the question of reliability of the measure from the question of its 
suitability or unsuitability for other purposes than recording mental states: for 
inferring quality of life, or for judging claims for support.  
Consider the case of happy invalids. Self-reported QoL appears to 
surprisingly often even increase after disablement or diagnosis of terminal 
illness (Phillips 2006: 50). The low and sometimes zero impact on SWB of 
(real, not thought-experiment) disability and debility (see e.g. Phillips, Ch.2) 
could however be attributed either to (1) evasive adaptive preferences – people 
learn not to punish themselves mentally on top of their physical punishment 
and learn how to downplay and ignore their disadvantage, or to (2) learning 
about what is most important in life—such as: relatedness, ability to set and 
pursue objectives, recognition, and so on—and concentrating on the real 
priorities, giving oneself greater ability to savor each day. The first type of 
preference adaptation gives what can be called the uncounted problems 
explanation, and would constitute an objection to SWB measures; but the latter 
phenomenon, the realisation of what are illusory or lesser problems, would not (Gasper 
2007b). For in this case preferences and behaviour evolve through the 
acquisition or resurfacing, and the use not evasion, of important information. 
That happy invalids have high SWB would not disprove that they have 
low OWB, as assessed in terms of collectively agreed values such as mobility, 
freedom from pain, or expected life-span. One purpose of making WB 
judgements in such a case is to answer the public policy question of whether, 
and by how much, is reduction of the chances of people becoming invalids a 
public priority. Clearly OWB not SWB is the relevant measure here. The 
invalids’ high SWB will be a relevant measure for other purposes, insofar as it 
is due to learning which problems are less important and what things are 
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greater blessings. Those invalids who have high SWB because they have 
learned in this way should not become disqualified for public support. Since 
SWB is variable between persons according to their own psychic resources, 
robustness and efforts, it should not be a lead person-specific policy criterion 
of deservingness or need.5 We must look there instead at OWB: an approved 
specification of the major environmental conditions and constitutional factors 
in the person’s life, including whether the person is physically handicapped. 
So, for the purposes of public evaluation and public action, capability (the 
real ability to access something important, like employment) is often a relevant 
measure or target, since it judges whether people have access, without seeking 
to substitute for their choices. When we deal with immature agents (such as 
children) and/or with what are considered the real basics (like avoiding the 
major infectious diseases, and acquiring the fundamental skills and knowledge 
required to make competent choices), then functionings often become the 
more relevant measure/target.  
A common misconception around the capability approach is that it is 
about individuals choosing between capabilities in light of their individual 
wishes or reasoned values. But individuals will typically use their wishes or 
reasoned values to decide directly between available functionings or 
commodities. The capability approach is relevant for public decision making 
about providing opportunities, especially access to public goods (here meaning 
goods deemed public priorities); it concerns group processes of deliberation 
and valuation rather than isolated choices by individuals (Gasper 2007c). 
Indeed it emphasises a further type of purpose, that of enriching public 
reflection and discussion (Crocker 2008). 
A purpose leads to a judgement only when we take into account other 
information, notably about the specific situation concerned. Our fourth 
dimension of relativity arises at the interface of context and purpose: standpoint. 
There are numerous different public decision-making contexts and purposes 
that can influence the type of QoL concept that is found relevant (see column 
five in Figure 1). Dasgupta (2001) shows how different organizations have to 
pursue different objectives, since responsibilities need to be divided. The 
conception of well-being or quality of life that is relevant for a particular 
organization will depend on its context and its corresponding purposes. For 
example, a government ministry for international development aid that 
distributes aid between countries according to their existing quality of life 
might decide not to include quality of family life in its criteria for inter-country 
allocation, for that could discriminate against countries which have 
compensated for material deprivation by giving intense attention to the family; 
but an organization seeking to explain social dynamics could certainly include 
family life in its well-being/QoL conception.  
Judgements of well-being or quality of life can be done by different 
persons or collectivities, from different standpoints. The valuation can be (i) by 
                                                 
5 Seligman offers a heuristic ‘Happiness Formula’: H (happiness) = S + C + V.  S is 
the person’s set-range: his/her typical happiness level or range; this is a dimension of 
personality. C = circumstances. V = factors under the person’s voluntary control, 
such as learning and reflection (Seligman, 2003: 45). 
 17
a person for herself, (ii) by a person for others:- for those represented 
politically; for dependents; for distant others; (iii) by a group for itself; (iv) by a 
group for others. We could well focus on capabilities when the purpose is to 
inform public policy, i.e. for cases other than case (i); except that we may refer 
to functionings when dealing with dependents (including children and the 
incapable), for whom we aim to consider their best interests (see views 
discussed in Archard & Skivenes 2009), and also sometimes when we defend 
the basic interests of all; so to have inoculations is a compulsory functioning, 
not merely an available option.  
 Compared to work on well-being, work on quality of life more often 
tends to take a standpoint within a public decisionmaking context and thus 
looks also at necessary conditions within the social environment. Thus, the 
European Foundation for Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
‘seeks to capture aspects of societal well-being going beyond the individuals’ 
capacity to pursue their own ends’ (Phillips 2006: 161). 
6  Differences of  social theory and psychological theory 
Different conceptions of well-being and quality of human life reflect different 
understandings of be-ing and of the structures of human life, in other words 
different ontologies and perspectives about the nature of persons and societies; 
for example between emphasis on people as consumers or as do-ers (Gasper 
2009b). The key dimension of contrast identified by Phillips in his survey of 
theories of quality of life is between conceptions of persons and hence 
conceptions of well-being which are individualistic and those which are in 
some sense more social. We must look also at the contrast within the set of 
individualistic conceptions between hedonic conceptions and those which are 
more reflective and discursive. Lastly we will see how the more reflective 
individualistic conceptions (such as Seligman’s) merge into the more social 
conceptions, for much of the reflection is about social relationships and since 
the formation and formulation of the ‘I’ whose be-ing is evaluated emerges and 
evolves through that reflective social interaction. 
Social/collective conceptions and individualistic conceptions 
A conception of well-being or of life-quality rests on a conception of being 
and/or of human life. Phillips contrasts conceptions which are individualistic 
and those which require much attention to a group level. In contrast to many 
poverty notions, the social exclusion notion, for example, rests on a social 
conception of quality of life, and emphasises matters like discrimination and 
alienation. Similarly, in Ubuntu philosophy, I am because you are; I am fine 
because you are fine; I am because I have ancestors; I am an inheritor and have 
inheritors; I exist in relation to and through you. 
Phillips identifies a series of relevant dimensions for theory comparison 
(2006: 230). Some theories presume that societal WB is identical to a sum of 
independently identifiable individual WBs; some reject this. We can ask 
whether a theory of well-being/quality of life emphasises:- social causes and 
requisites of individual wellbeing; aspects of individual wellbeing that are 
fundamentally social; individuals’ prioritisation of the well-being of others and 
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of collective wellbeing; and individuals’ or groups’ valuations of those aspects 
of wellbeing which are relational.  
Jordan (2008), for example, contrasts theories of ‘welfare’ as in welfare 
economics (set 3a in Phillips’ listing), with theories of ‘well-being’ from social 
and cultural studies. Theories of ‘welfare’ consider the forms of individual 
choice within impersonal markets, and presume that these can be generalized 
to all human interaction. In Jordan’s terms, they analyse economic value. 
Theories of ‘well-being’, in his terms, analyse ‘social value’, which is produced 
and exchanged through culture. However, although ‘the social value associated 
with power, status, esteem, respect, membership and belonging stems from 
social relations, [it is] often communicated through the exchange and sharing 
of commodities’ (Jordan, 2008:128). Consumption is to a large extent about 
creating and maintaining meanings, ‘communicating claims to esteem and 
influence, and enabling the shared activities through which relationships are 
conducted’ (p.116). But, Jordan argues: ‘Because of its methodological 
individualism, economic analysis cannot encompass the processes by which 
interactions generate and distribute symbolic social value, and regulate such 
processes through culture and institutions.’ (p.242). He seeks to explain the 
Easterlin paradox in terms of economic processes which undermine social 
value at the same time as they generate economic value. 
It would be particularly unfortunate to ignore the collectivist aspects of 
WB/QoL since we already have numerous individualist indicators and policy 
remains dominated by measures like GNP, which merely adds up a total of 
individual gross incomes. ‘[A]part from a very few exceptions inter-personal 
relations, or sociality-as-relationality, is absent among the key ingredients of 
happiness’ treated by economists (Bruni and Porta 2007: xx). Pugno (2007) is 
one exception, who builds from the evidence that close interpersonal 
relationships are central to well-being and can be jeopardised by certain 
patterns of socio-economic change. 
Consider then the following sorts of position: 
a) A form of ontological individualism: Individual WBs/QoLs are 
considered not constitutively interactive—one person’s well-being does 
not affect that of another; so if you suffer, I may be affected via the 
impact of this on your actions and contributions but not through 
sympathy with your suffering. Societal QoL is the sum of individual 
QoLs determined in isolation, because people are fundamentally 
discrete entities. 
b) Ethical individualism: Individual QoLs may (or may not) be 
constitutively interactive, via sympathy, but societal QoL is obtained by 
adding up individual QoLs, either (b1) as specified by individuals or 
(b2) as the sum of collectively determined individual QoLs (i.e., 
determined by authorised representatives or experts). 
c) Societal QoL cannot be identified through adding up individual QoLs 
because an individual’s sense of self is not so separate from his/her 
feeling of identity and commitment as a member of a group or groups 
(cf. Zarri 2007). Societal QoL is then conceived as (c1) a synthesis of 
individual assessments of collective QoL, or as (c2) collectively 
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determined (by authorised representatives or collective vote) collective 
QoL.  
Conceptions (c1) and (c2), which focus on a category of collective quality 
of life, reflect a notion that people are fundamentally group members. 
Conception (b1) is perhaps the main one in rich countries. Let us probe further 
its tradition of work on individualist indicators of individual well-being, in 
particular its SWB stream.  
Choices within subjectivist conceptions – hedonic versus eudaimonic conceptions 
Much work on SWB takes it as something definite, to be measured and 
statistically interpreted almost like length or weight. Yet it is, or can be and 
should be, a product of reflection and interpretation, and hence is inevitably 
ambiguous – as not only a vector concept but one with greyness in each of its 
dimensions. The ‘instant utility’ in one part of our nervous system is not the 
only or main criterion; we have reflective and interpretive powers which we 
can use to say that we approve even when we are suffering, or disapprove even 
when we are experiencing pleasure. Just as people have preferences about their 
own preferences, so they have some more and some less reflective ways of 
ranking their state of mind. Chekola provides a thoughtful warning against 
simplified, ‘limited and barren’, non-cognitive concepts of happiness 
(2007:221.) 
In a eudaimonic rather than hedonic conception of SWB—as argued by 
Deci and Ryan (2001) in psychology, and Bruni and Porta (2007) in 
economics—one rates mature and informed reflective fulfilment above 
immediate or unconsidered pleasure. This matches the Aristotelian tradition, 
where ‘happiness means well-doing … [and] this “doing” also means directing 
action by thought’ (Vivenza 2007: 8). Similarly for Buddhist thought ‘The most 
common error is to confuse pleasure for happiness’ (Ricard 2005: 40); ‘we so 
often confuse genuine happiness with merely seeking enjoyable emotions’ 
(ibid., p.28). 
We are centrally interested in the quality of persons’ subjectivity and 
reflection. In the happy invalid case, we objected in some respects to the 
variants where an individual achieves happiness by evading reality; in contrast 
to the variants where the invalid achieves happiness by embracing reality, 
identifying sources of deeper meaning and fulfilment in life and focussing on 
those. 
If obliged to rank one’s mental state and/or life situation on a scale of 1 to 
4 or 1 to 10 or whatever, in response to a researcher, each one of us can give 
an answer, and the answer may be fairly steady if repeated—reliable in the 
scientific sense—reflecting a certain equilibrium that expresses one’s 
personality and way of thinking. But when describing one’s mental state and 
life situation to oneself—say in a diary—or to others, in one’s daily 
conversations and correspondence, one might never use such a scale. Nor does 
anyone use it when trying to describe a known person’s mental state and life 
situation; novelists do not, but nor do journalists or friends or colleagues or 
superiors, let alone family members. How can we interpret this discrepancy? 
Something fundamental might be missing in some of the research on SWB.   
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If assessment of well-being for others is complex, for the reasons we have 
touched on – the choices of scope, of value, of purpose and standpoint, of 
theoretical framework, of evidence and in reasoning – then why would we 
expect dramatic simplicity when people make well-being assessments for 
themselves? We should not. 
 Well-being and quality of life are vector concepts. Many components in 
the vector can be fuzzy and contingent, as product of a complex judgement 
process, and the significance of a component may depend on several of the 
other components. Whether an experience or even a sensation is felt as pain or 
pleasure may depend on its social and interpretive context: the pain of the 
religious ecstatic is experienced as pleasure or joy. Zamagni notes how 
happiness is profoundly dependent on a social context, in which people 
interrelate as actors with meaning-laden identities, not as the meaning-drained 
agents of traditional economic theory who cared only for their utility-meters. 
That was close to an economics of autistic beings rather than real social human 
beings, and is inadequate for understanding happiness (Zamagni 2005: 329). 
People are, on the other hand, not merely ant-like members of a 
collectivity. The self arises through thinking about and in relation to others. 
People’s reflections, and their ideas of the self (/selves) whose well-being they 
seek to promote, are formed and conducted in terms of socially created 
systems of symbols and meanings. If we see people as reflective social beings 
not as utility-meters, then well-being research requires wider horizons than 
much hedonic SWB research, conclude Bruni and Porta and many of the 
contributors in their two recent volumes (2005, 2007). 
We should refine the argument. First, judgemental evaluative character 
applies more especially to thinking about the past and the future than to 
reacting in the present. It is especially important for the life-satisfaction 
component in SWB.6 Positive affect and negative affect are closer to being 
‘mental temperature’ type entities. Even these components however, while in 
substantial part determined by the intersection of life events and circumstances 
and by personality (including a person’s ‘set range’ of feeling), are also 
significantly variable according to how people learn to think about their life 
events and circumstances, how they interpret them. The principle of ‘count 
your blessings’, for example, applies also in interpreting current experience, not 
only when reviewing the past. Similarly, pleasures can be increased by knowing 
how to savor them. Interestingly, the single most effective way of doing that 
appears to be to share the experience with others (Seligman 2003: 108).  
Secondly, Seligman’s contrast between the pleasures (inevitably temporary 
positive affect) and the gratifications—a contrast stressed also by JS Mill, 
Alfred Marshall, and Tibor Scitovsky amongst others—or that between 
hedonic and eudaimonic emphases in the study of subjective well-being, could 
be a more fundamental divide in well-being studies than is the contrast 
                                                 
6 The concepts of life-satisfaction and eudaimonic SWB may substantially overlap (as 
assumed in Figure 1) but the latter seems too plural for them to be identical. The 
concepts of eudaimonic SWB and objective well-being overlap when the eudaimonic 
SWB values of autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 2001) are 
collectively or authoritatively identified as ‘substantive goods’. 
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between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ well-being conceptions. Eudaimonic 
emphases include reflection, absorption, and (as source of the absorption) 
meaningfulness. This meaningfulness involves not just providing a stimulating 
challenge to skills but the undertaking of something of value within a 
community and/or for a cause larger than oneself. Eudaimonic SWB thus 
concerns or includes reflective engagement in things of wider value. Any 
interpretation of ‘objective well-being’ is in several respects similar: it is the 
product of a collective reflection on what is of general value within a 
community. A constant preoccupation with pleasures, with obtaining positive 
affect and avoiding negative affect—typically fanned by marketing that urges 
people to continually spend—diverts people from deeper gratifications that do 
not involve short run pleasure and convenience but instead the building and 
exercise of personal strengths. Since the pleasures are ephemeral, 
preoccupation with them promotes instead in the longer run a greater 
proneness to dissatisfaction and depression, concludes Seligman (2003). 
Thirdly, we might find that choices of ontological and theoretical 
perspective are in practice often affected by matters of value choice, purpose, 
standpoint, and even convenience in data collection. That possibility requires 
fuller examination than I have space for here. 
7   Conclusion 
I summarise the main points argued above as follows.  
1. The concepts of well-being and quality of life refer to evaluative judgements 
about selected aspects or the entirety of a life-situation or life-path, for an 
individual, group or society. They do not refer to one or other unitary and 
objective entity. They should be understood as abstract nouns, umbrella terms, 
which cover many different possible concepts. Even if there are certain 
objective entities (e.g., positive affect) that are often closely associated, these 
are not identical to a judgement about well-being / QoL and are sometimes 
rejected as insufficient or misleading indicators.  
2. These evaluative judgements are made in many different ways, according to 
choices in at least six dimensions: focus of attention, values used, research 
instruments used, guiding purposes of the exercise, standpoint adopted, and 
theoretical framework employed. We saw an illustration of this in how there 
are many different notions of ‘subjective wellbeing’ and of ‘objective 
wellbeing’. 
3. Different choices in these dimensions underlie the diversity of traditions in 
thinking about well-being and quality-of-life, including the traditions surveyed 
by Phillips (2006): the subjective well-being tradition from psychology; quality-
of-life work in health sciences; the economics-based tradition of ‘utility’ 
estimation; theories of human need and/or capability; poverty studies; studies 
of community quality-of-life and social fabric; and overarching quality-of-life 
constructs.  
4. These traditions focus at different levels along a ‘ladder of living’, from 
contexts, to having resources and getting goods, through consuming, to 
enjoying. Eudaimonic conceptions mistrust an emphasis on enjoyment as a 
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mental output that follows a certain activity, rather than on satisfaction as a 
judgement of the meaningfulness and fittingness found in suitable activity.  In 
terms of values, all conceptions use one or other set of value-criteria, which 
underlie the choice of focus.  
5. Choices in research methodology partly reflect choices in the other 
dimensions, notably choices of value and differing policy preoccupations, but 
they demand separate attention for they also reflect differing ideas about the 
nature and possibilities of social science and the influence of data availability.  
6. Different purposes contribute to the formation of different concepts and 
judgements of well-being and life quality: purposes of description, explanation 
and prediction of other people; of understanding, finding meaning in, and 
living our own lives; of evaluating and choosing for oneself; and evaluating and 
choosing (also) for others. In all cases, concepts of well-being and life quality 
should be seen as practical attitudes: constructed to serve particular purposes 
in particular contexts. Different purposes and contexts will lead to differently 
constructed attitudes. Self-reports of subjective well-being, for example, can be 
valid and reliable for certain purposes, but do not prove to be sufficient, valid 
and reliable for all other important purposes. 
7.  Different conceptions of well-being and quality of human life reflect 
different ontologies: understandings of be-ing and of the elements of human 
life. Two key contrasts are, firstly, between conceptions of persons and hence 
conceptions of well-being which are individualistic and those which are more 
social; and, secondly, between conceptions which see well-being as a life-
outcome which can be measured in the same sort of way as weight, and 
conceptions which are more reflective and discursive. The more reflective 
individualistic conceptions and the more social conceptions of well-being flow 
into each other, for the formulation of the ‘I’ whose be-ing is evaluated 
emerges through social interactions. 
What should we do with these diverse conceptualisations of quality of life 
or well-being? We can try to add them all together, to give an eclectic heap (as, 
for example, Berger-Schnitt and Noll, 2000), and this may have some 
democratic merit. Quite often however different conceptions point in different 
directions, providing us with paradoxes that have driven the field of happiness 
studies (Bruni and Porta eds. 2007; Gasper 2005, 2007b).7  We can seek a 
theoretical rationale for selecting just one school, as some pure utilitarians 
essay, or for building a particular synthesis, as Phillips attempts. Or, as I have 
suggested in this paper, we can try to understand them as having different roles 
and different occasions of relevance. We need to reflect on and then focus in 
scope according to our judgements on: purposes, roles and standpoint, as well 
as on values, theoretical perspective, and the adequacy and feasibility of the 
required procedures and instruments. We should always reflect consciously on 
each of these aspects. Clarifying the different conceptions and dimensions 
helps us too in better understanding the paradoxes. 
                                                 
7 Economics-and-happiness work focuses on divergences between measures of 
subjective well-being and income. Equally interesting and important are the common 
divergences between objective and subjective well-being measures, and between 
measures of income and objective well-being (Gasper 2005, 2007b). 
 23
References 
Archard, D., & M. Skivenes, 2009. Balancing a Child’s Best Interests and a Child’s 
Views. International J. of Children’s Rights, 17(1), 1-22. 
Bartolini, S., 2007. Why are people so unhappy? Why do they strive so hard for money? 
Competing explanations of the broken promises of economic growth. Pp. 337-364 
in Bruni & Porta (eds.), 2007. 
Beck, W., & L. vd Maesen, F. Thomése, A. Walker (eds.), 2001. Social Quality: A Vision 
for Europe. The Hague: Kluwer. 
Berger-Schmitt, R., and Noll, H., 2000. Conceptual framework and structure of a 
European system of social indicators. Euroreporting Working Paper #9, Mannheim: 
Centre for Survey Research and Methodology. 
Bowling, A., 1995. Measuring Disease: A review of disease-specific quality of life measurement 
scales. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Bruni, L, and Porta, P.L., eds., 2005. Economics and Happiness. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press. 
Bruni, L, and Porta, P.L., 2007. Introduction. In Bruni and Porta eds., 2007. 
Bruni, L, and Porta, P.L., eds., 2007. Handbook on the Economics of Happiness. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Chekola, M., 2007. The life plan view of happiness and the paradoxes of happiness. 
Pp.221-236  in Bruni and Porta (eds.) 2007. 
Crocker, D.A., 2008. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability and Deliberative 
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Dasgupta, P., 2001. Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment, Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press. 
Deci, E., and R. Ryan, 2001. On happiness and human potentials: a review of 
research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 
52, 141-166. 
Douglas, M., 1982, In the Active Voice, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Doyal, L. and Gough, I., 1991. A Theory of Need. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Dutt, A.K., 2001. In Dutt & K.P. Jameson (eds.), 2001, Crossing the Mainstream – Ethical 
and Methodological Issues in Economics, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press.  
Easterlin, R., 2005. Building a Better Theory of Well-Being. Pp. 29-64 in Bruni and 
Porta eds., 2005. 
Frank, R., 2005. Does Absolute Income Matter? Pp. 65-90 in Bruni and Porta (eds.), 
2005. 
Gasper, D., 2005: Subjective and Objective Well-Being in Relation to Economic 
Inputs: Puzzles and Responses. Review of Social Economy, LXIII (2), 177-206.  
----2007a: Human Well-Being: Concepts and Conceptualizations. In Human Well-Being: 
Concept and Measurement, ed. M. McGillivray, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 
23-64.  
----2007b: Uncounted or Illusory Blessings? Competing Responses to the Easterlin, 
Easterbrook and Schwartz Paradoxes of Well-Being. J. of International Development, 
19(4), 473-492.  
----2007c. What is the Capability Approach? Its Core, Rationale, Partners and Dangers. 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 36(3), 335-359. 
----2009a: From Valued Freedoms, To Polities And Markets - The Capability 
Approach In Policy Practice. Revue Tiers Monde, no. 198.  
 24
----2009b. Capitalism and Human Flourishing? The strange story of the bias to activity 
and the downgrading of work. In J.B. Davis (ed.) Global Social Economy, London: 
Routledge. 
Gilbert, D., 2005. Stumbling on Happiness. New York: Vintage. 
Gordon, D., 2000. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain, York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
Hirata, J., and M. Vendrik, 2007. Experienced versus decision utility of income. Pp. 
185-208 in Bruni and Porta (eds.) 2007. 
Jesus Garcia, J. de, et al., 2007. Value and Happiness in Mexico. Pp. 407-428 in Bruni 
and Porta eds., 2007. 
Jordan, B., 2008. Welfare and Well-Being: Social value in public policy. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Kahneman, D., 1999. Objective Happiness, in: Kahneman, E. Diener, N. Schwarz 
(eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation: 3-25. 
Max-Neef, M., 1991. Human-scale Development, New York & London: Apex Press. 
Nussbaum, M., 2005. Mill between Aristotle and Bentham. Pp. 170-183 in Bruni and 
Porta (eds.), 2005. 
Pawson, R., and Tilley, N., 1997. Realistic Evaluation. London: Sage. 
Phillips, D., 2006. Quality of Life. London: Routledge. 
Pugno, M., 2007. The subjective well-being paradox: a suggested solution based on 
relational goods. Pp. 263-289 in Bruni and Porta (eds.) 2007. 
Ricard, M., 2007. Happiness. London: Atlantic Books. 
RIVM, 2004. Quality and the future – Sustainability outlook. English summary. Bilthoven: 
RIVM, Netherlands Institute for Public Health and Environment. 
Robeyns, I., and vd Veen, R.J., 2007. Sustainable Quality of Life – conceptual analysis for a 
policy-relevant empirical specification. MNP Report 550031006 / 2007, Bilthoven: 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 
Scanlon, T., 1993. Value, Desire and Quality of Life. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen 
(eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 184-200. 
Seel, M., 1997. Well-Being: On a Fundamental Concept of Practical Philosophy. 
European Journal of Philosophy, 5(1). 
Seligman, M., 2003. Authentic Happiness. London: Nicholas Brealey. 
Veenhoven, R., 2005. Happiness in Hardship. Pp. 243-266 in Bruni and Porta (eds.), 
2005. 
----2007. Subjective Measures of Well-Being. Pp. 214-239 in M. McGillivray (ed) 
Human Well Being: Concept and Measurement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vivenza, G., 2007. Happiness, wealth and utility in ancient thought. Pp. 3-23 in Bruni 
and Porta (eds.), 2007. 
Zamagni, S., 2005. Happiness and Individualism: A Very Difficult Union. Pp. 303-335 
in Bruni and Porta (eds.), 2005. 
Zarri, L., 2007. Happiness, morality and game theory. Pp.318-336 in Bruni and Porta 
(eds.), 2007. 
